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A political revolution consists of an inherent change in the dynamics of power and is 
motivated by several factors that ultimately result in a change within the cultural, economic and 
socio-political structures of a state. Mehran Kamrava’s Modern Middle East further elaborates 
on the nature of revolutions by providing a classification and argues that there are four types of 
revolution. For instance, revolution can be planned, negotiated or a movement that is instigated 
from the upper echelon of a political structure (Kamrava, 96). The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 
1979 by the course of its materialization was a revolution which was spontaneous in nature and 
fundamentally altered the political structure and ideology of Iran. 
As identified by Kamrava and the procession of events in Iranian history, the central 
causes of the revolution were public frustration over mounting rates of unemployment, 
deteriorating economic conditions as a result of the 1973 oil crisis, as well as resentment towards 
a political system that was inherently corrupt and primarily favoured the merchant class of Iran 
(99). An increasing dissatisfaction with Shah Pahlavi’s inefficient and oppressive regime 
inevitably led to mass demonstrations against him and due to the fact that the religious clergy 
was the most influential, respected and organized political opposition to the monarchy, it was 
Ayatollah Khomeini who became the central opponent to the Shah and assumed the role of the 
revolutionary leader. It is most important to note that an analysis of the Iranian Revolution also 
puts into perspective the ramifications of the revolution on the current political attitude and 
structure of Iran as well as on its relations with other states. 
  
Prior to examining the direct causes of the revolution, it is important to understand the 
political background of Iran between the years 1950 and 1979. At this time, Iran was a unique 
state in the Middle East largely because it did not experience the rule of the Ottomans and 
neither did it experience large degrees of external intervention in its affairs. However, the 
nationalist rhetoric that was adopted by many states in the Middle East was also adopted in Iran 
under the administration of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was elected into office 
in 1951 at a time when the United States and the United Kingdom were becoming increasingly 
interested in Iran’s oil reserves (102). Mosaddegh, who was the leader of the National Front 
Party, conducted an election campaign on the basis of opposition to foreign presence in Iran. 
Mosaddegh was ultimately elected on the basis of the party’s oil policy, which called for the 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil companies so that the revenue generated from the oil 
would be received by Iran instead of foreign companies. This policy was very popular with 
Iranians, largely because it was in tune with nationalist sentiment of the period. The British, 
however, responded by placing an oil embargo on Iran which prohibited the country from 
exporting any oil produced in the formerly British controlled companies. British ships were also 
sent to the Persian Gulf in order to enforce the embargo and the de facto economic sanctions 
resulted in the emergence of an economic crisis in Iran since oil was the largest source of 
revenue for the Iranian economy (104). 
 Foreign intervention did not halt at the juncture of imposing economic sanctions 
however; a coup was carried out against Mosaddegh’s administration in 1953 that was 
orchestrated by the Iranian army, the American CIA and the British MI6 in a venture called 
Operation Ajax. The Iranian military did not favour Mosaddegh’s nationalist agenda and as such 
requested for aid from the United States and the United Kingdom to remove the elected 
  
administration. In response, the CIA approved the expenditure of $1 million in order to 
orchestrate the coup and initiated a propaganda campaign against Mosaddegh in Tehran, 
organized by both American and British intelligence officials. The Shah had been in exile since 
the election of Mosaddegh in 1951 but was returned by the Americans and the British in the 
aftermath of the coup, largely because he was not in opposition to foreign interests in Iran. In the 
direct aftermath of the coup, he resumed trading oil with foreign companies and, more 
significantly, the United States and the United Kingdom protected their interests in the region by 
directly intervening in Iran and thus subduing the threat of the expansion of nationalism in the 
Middle East (110). The direct foreign intervention in the form of the coup cultivated the seeds 
for initial public opposition to the Shah’s rule and mass uprisings against the monarch took place 
throughout the 1960s due to the fact that a democratically elected leader was deposed by external 
actors and the Shah now catered to the interest of those actors instead to those of the Iranian 
people. 
 The central causes that led to the materialization of the revolution included high 
unemployment rates, worsening economic conditions and the inherent corrupt nature of the 
monarchy, which favoured the elite merchant class both politically and economically. The 
Bazaar elite class, which was Iran’s merchant class, supported the Shah en masse because it 
benefited the most from the political structure. The Shah’s economic policies were ambitious in 
nature but proved to be inefficient in the light of the 1973 economic crisis, which greatly affected 
the Iranian economy. The 1973 oil crisis was initiated after members of the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Companies (OAPEC) declared an oil embargo as a war tactic during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War (115). As a direct result of the embargo, the price of oil rose dramatically 
and the ensuing economic shock had a detrimental effect on the economic systems of many 
  
states, including Iran, which was an oil-generating country. As a result of the oil crisis, rates of 
unemployment increased in Iran and the overall economic health of the country worsened, which 
primarily affected the urban and rural class of the country. Additionally, the Shah’s efforts to 
secularize and Westernize Iran did not benefit the lower middle class and drew public criticisms 
from both the urban middle class and the rural class, as well as the religious factions of the 
country, who perceived the Shah’s political and economic policies as efforts to de-Islamize Iran 
(124).  
The larger sentiment within Iran amidst worsening economic conditions was that the 
political structure was inherently inefficient and that the Shah’s policies only benefited the elite 
class who continued to prosper economically under the monarchy. The Shah sustained the wealth 
and political influence of the Bazaar elite class through channels of corruption and nepotism and 
this overt favouring of the elites increasingly alienated most of the Iranian population, 
particularly the rural population residing outside Tehran. It was also the rural population of the 
country that was most influenced by religious factions in Iran because the religious clergy in Iran 
was an influential and increasingly respected political entity. It was Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shiite 
cleric and a prominent charismatic religious leader, who had already organized opposition 
against the Shah during the White Revolution in 1963. The opposition was based on the rhetoric 
of political reformation that would allow religious minorities to hold positions of political power 
and ultimately popularized anti-Western and anti-Shah sentiments throughout Iran. Khomeini’s 
incitation of the demonstrations ultimately led to the exile of the religious cleric in 1964 to Paris 
(132). 
The most significant factor that put Khomeini into the position of being the central 
opponent to the Shah in 1979 was the fact that the religious figure translated the concerns of the 
  
religious factions in Iran into larger political and economic concerns that affected the whole 
Iranian population. Khomeini’s political influence over large portions of the Iranian population 
was showcased by the fact that the religious leader’s political influence increased while he was 
in exile and his political sermons, which denounced the Shah and the monarchy’s relations with 
the US, were smuggled into Iran. This forum of propaganda proved to be extremely efficient 
because Khomeini continued to gain political notoriety despite being in exile for over a decade. 
It is also important to note that not all groups and individuals who opposed the Shah were 
necessarily followers of Khomeini, yet Khomeini was intelligent enough to capitalize on the fact 
that there was no organized political opposition against the Shah.  
Consequently, the combination of high unemployment rates, overall worsening economic 
conditions, political corruption and a strong religious clergy who formed an opposition to the 
monarchy culminated in the development of the 1978 street protests against the Shah and Iran’s 
political structure (136). The street protests of 1978 were spontaneous demonstrations in 
opposition to the political system in order to demand state accountability which later intensified 
and led to the expulsion of the Shah. The main participants of the initial street protests were 
students, the urban class, the rural class and religious factions. The main point of opposition was 
to the Shah’s economic policies that continued to strengthen the merchant elite class while the 
rest of Iran faced worsening economic conditions and increasing unemployment rates. 
The demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed by the Shah through the use of SAVAK, 
which was the domestic security and intelligence service established by the Shah. Trained and 
armed by the United States, SAVAK forces attacked street protestors and captured any 
opponents of the regime, which in turn increased opposition against the Shah and the United 
States (142). The street protests were no longer only about the state’s economic policies but 
  
rather reflected a fervent desire for political change which could only be satisfied through the 
expulsion of the Shah. After the initiation of violence by the Shah, the protestors attacked any 
and all symbols that were linked to the Shah or foreign interveners, which included the 
destruction of businesses. In response, the regime’s suppression of the protests intensified.  
However, as highlighted in the introductory paragraph, the combination of worsening 
economic conditions, political nepotism, and corruption, the increasing influence of the religious 
clergy as well as the emergence of vibrant protestors proved to be a lethal cocktail for the Shah’s 
regime. In February of 1979 the Iranian Islamic Revolution proved to be successful and 
Ayatollah Khomeini was given the role of being the leader of the revolution, primarily due to the 
fact that there was an absence of another organized political leader. The Shah fled to Japan and 
Khomeini finally returned to Iran after being in exile for 15 years and was jubilantly welcomed 
in Iran by the people. Iran was officially declared an Islamic Republic in 1979, and the state 
became a theocracy in practice, demonstrated by the fact that the Quran was designated to be the 
constitution of the country (150).  
The Iranian Revolution immediately and fundamentally altered Iran’s political relations 
with its neighbouring states as well as its traditional allies. Right on the heels of the Shah’s 
expulsion and the eradication of the monarchy, the hostage crisis that lasted 444 days took place 
and ultimately soured the political relations between Iran and the United States, the implications 
of which still affect current political relations between the two states. After the revolution there 
was a populist pressure to have the Shah return to Iran in order to face charges of war crimes 
committed by the monarchy and SAVAK during the street protests in 1978, but this demand was 
refused both by the Shah and the United States. The continuation of US support for the Shah fed 
the frustration of the Iranian public and resulted in the targeting of the US embassy in Iran in 
  
November of 1979 in which 90 students stormed the embassy and took 66 Americans hostage for 
444 days. The hostage situation, although not directly orchestrated by Khomeini and the new 
regime, was not denounced by Khomeini either and most of the individuals who took part in the 
hostage crisis were avid supporters of Khomeini. President Reagan ultimately negotiated the deal 
for the return of the hostages in exchange of the provision of arms to Iran, however this crisis 
proved to be pivotal because the political relationship between the US and Iran turned extremely 
hostile. This was showcased by the severing of direct bilateral diplomatic relations between the 
two states, including the closure of the US embassy in Iran after the hostage crisis in 1979.  
At the same time Iran was severing political ties with the United States the country 
entered a war with Iraq almost immediately after the revolution. The 1980 Iran-Iraq War took 
place due to several factors which included the longstanding border dispute over the Shatt al-
Arab river that both countries claimed as their own (159). The region around the river was fertile 
and the waterway was also strategic in terms of a channel for oil exportation. The population in 
the region was constituted of both Iraqis and Iranians which further complicated the land claims. 
Another crucial factor behind the initiation of the war was based on the fear of former Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein that the revolution in Iran might also encourage the Shiite population 
in Iraq (which is approximately 60% of the total population) to instigate their own revolution. 
Saddam’s Baathist party was secular and nationalist in nature and any form of religious politics 
was not tolerated by the regime. As such, the rise of Khomeini and the establishment of a 
theocracy posed a direct threat to Saddam’s political power. Additionally, Saddam wished to 
fulfill the role of the regional hegemon and it was assumed that Iran’s military opposed 
Khomeini and was clearly fragile in the direct aftermath of political instability.  
  
However, it is crucial to note that Iraq’s assumptions about Iran’s military state were 
completely false because the Islamic Republic now had a new raison d’être which included 
political activism. Iraq’s invasion increased mass domestic support for Khomeini because just 
like the United States and the Shah, Iraq represented anti-Islamic and pro-Western sentiments. 
With the possession of mass domestic support, Khomeini organized a collective military 
response to the Iraqi invasion and the war proved to be a stalemate between the states. In the 
period between 1980 and 1988, more than one million Iranians and Iraqis lost their lives, which 
included the 1988 Iraqi regime gassing of 5000 Iraqi Kurds who were seeking political 
autonomy. It is also important to note that throughout the war the United States and the Soviets 
supported both Iran and Iraq in order to make sure that neither party gained too much political 
influence, which would threaten Israel’s regional hegemony. 
The central causes of the Iranian Islamic Revolution have been discussed in explicit 
detail; however, it is also important to analyze the political ramifications of the revolution. The 
revolution was perceived to be a threat by the US, specifically because the Cold War had not yet 
ended. The larger perception was that if Iran was not politically allied with the US any longer 
then the only other alternative would be to be allied with the USSR, which would raise direct 
obstacles to US and neoliberal Western political and economic interests in the region. There was 
also the fear in the US that Iran might incite anti-American sentiments in neighbouring states and 
that it might become an exporter of theocratic and religious-based political movements to states 
like Saudi Arabia. However, the US did not take into account the fact that Khomeini was a Shiite 
cleric and that the religious-based political movement that took place in Iran could not possibly 
take place in every country that mainly adhered to Islam because of the sectarian diversity in the 
region. The perception that Iran was a political threat largely emerged from the notion that Iran 
  
was a success story of a theocratic revolution and because of this reality it had the potential to 
become a leader in the instigation of similarly anti-American, anti-Western, religious movements 
in regional monarchies who sustain Western interests in the region. This fear was realized in 
Iran’s strong relations with Syria despite varying religious outlooks, as well as in the special 
relationship with Ghadaffi’s Libya, which also shared Iran’s anti-Western rhetoric. Additionally, 
Iran’s political and financial support of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a Shiite militant group, further 
fueled the foreign perception that Iran actively sought to export its theocratic revolution to other 
areas in the region. In contrast, the Iranian perception of its revolution is one of an alternative 
vision to both capitalism and communism and it is a narrative of survival against global 
sanctions and political isolation. The rhetoric ascribed to by the Iranians is that a state can 
survive politically and economically as the enemy of the United States and, despite being a rogue 
state, it has set an example for other political systems who also wish to adopt an anti-
interventionist rhetoric. 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 has also had profound ramifications on the current 
political attitude and structure of Iran, which still principally adheres to the theocratic tenets laid 
out by Khomeini after the revolution. The political power still lies in the hands of Ali Khamenei, 
who took over the role of the Supreme Leader of Iran after the death of Khomeini in 1989, which 
also includes the roles of the head of state and the highest ranking political and religious 
authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The political structure of Iran is still predominantly 
traditional in nature, however it is also important to note that an increasing degree of reformist 
rhetoric has also come into play into Iranian politics largely in an effort to fight the US and 
Western economic sanctions placed on the country in response to perceived Iranian nuclear 
aggression. The sanctions have crippled the state’s economic functions and although the 
  
reformers still adhere to the theocratic principles of the Islamic Republic, they also advocate for 
the relaxation of some aspects of the state’s anti-Western policies that had been exacerbated 
under the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad between 2005 and 2013. The current 
President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, is a reformist who has initiated nuclear talks with five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5 +1) in an effort to establish 
the point that Iran’s nuclear program is being developed for energy purposes only. The talks have 
marked a turning point in Iran’s relations with the United States and other Western states in an 
effort to re-establish diplomatic ties that will result in the easing of economic sanctions placed on 
Iran.  
 In the end, the central factors that caused the materialization of the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution were public dissatisfaction with the increasing rates of unemployment and worsening 
economic conditions in the country in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. Additional central 
factors were the inherently corrupt nature of the political system, which lacked accountability 
and favoured the merchant class that continued to prosper in times of economic crisis. The 
opposition to the Shah was mobilized in 1979 by the religious clergy of the country, with 
Khomenei holding the reins, largely because the religious factions were the most influential, 
respected and organized political opponents to the Shah’s political structure. The political 
ramifications of the Iranian Revolution were profound because it altered Iran’s political relations 
with neighbouring states like Iraq as well as traditional allies like the United States. The 
revolution also inherently altered the political ideology and structure of Iranian politics, which 
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